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 10	  
The debate about the relation between psychiatric disorder and neural defect has produced 11	  
different argumentative strategies for and against the identification of these two phenomena. I’ll coin 12	  
these strategies as a) an ontological strategy, b) the extensional strategy and c) an intensional 13	  
strategy, on which I will focus in this article.  14	  
The first, ontological strategy takes the long road over a detailed characterization of the nature of 15	  
psychiatric disorders and of neural defects. It then goes on to argue for a relation between these two 16	  
ontological kinds. One anti-reductionist proposition of an ontological strategy can be found in Stier 17	  
(2013). He provides a sketch of a theory of the nature of psychiatric diseases, claiming inter alia that 18	  
psychiatric diseases are social constructions and intrinsically normative. He goes on to infer a non-19	  
reducibility thesis from these more or less ontological characterizations: “if the boundary between 20	  
normality and mental disorder is a social construction such that the question of whether a certain kind 21	  
of behaviour is a disorder can only be judged against the background of this very convention, then 22	  
the ‘disorderness’ of a condition cannot be found on—and hence not be reduced to—the neuronal 23	  
level” (Stier 2013, 3). While Stier’s argument fluctuates between an epistemic and ontological non-24	  
reducibility thesis, I take him to be talking about the nature of psychiatric diseases and thus about an 25	  
ontological issue foremost.  26	  
The second, extensional strategy investigates the phenomena that fall into both categories in order 27	  
to relate the categories. In principle one would have to identify all psychiatric diseases and their 28	  
pathways in the brain. If one could identify at least one neural causal pathway for each psychiatric 29	  
disease, all psychiatric diseases could be assumed to be brain diseases. Alternatively one could use a 30	  
falsificatory strategy and look for one psychiatric disease which does not have a neural causal 31	  
pathway. Obviously both are only in principle and not practically viable options. Universally 32	  
quantified statements and claims of non-existence are well-nigh impossible to prove. Typically, the 33	  
extensional method is applied in exemplary research projects. Proponents of the identity or 34	  
reducibility of psychiatric disease to neural phenomena try to show that a certain psychiatric disease 35	  
can be explained with reference to neural phenomena. Opponents of reducibility try to identify 36	  
psychiatric diseases for which an explanation via some neural, causal pathway is improbable. The 37	  
extensional strategy has to combat severe methodological challenges as discussed by Kapur et al. 38	  
(2012; cf. the discussion in Walter 2013): the power of neuro-psychiatric studies, the limited 39	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replication of studies, the reliance on extreme comparisons and of course, as Walter (2013) mentions, 40	  
the ethical issues of research on the living brain. 41	  
The third, intensional strategy takes a slightly shorter road to elucidating the relation between 42	  
psychiatric disorders and neural defects by discussing their explanatory roles: looking at the way the 43	  
categories are defined and applied. 44	  
Turning to intensional methods requires some restriction in the use of the categories and concepts 45	  
in question. Thus, instead of talking loosely about mental, psychiatric or psychological diseases or 46	  
illnesses and physical, neural or brain based diseases or states the focus will be on psychiatric 47	  
disorders and neural defects. The term ‘psychiatric disorder’ will be used for two reasons: 1) 48	  
‘disorder’ is the term used in the ICD 10 and in DSM IV and V; 2) I do not want to talk about the 49	  
alleged mental / physical divide, but about the categorizations of the relevant scientific disciplines, in 50	  
this case psychiatry; thus I do not use ‘mental disorder’. The term ‘neural defect’ will be used for two 51	  
similar reasons: 1) ‘defect’ seems to be the weakest functional term (more on functional terms in a 52	  
moment). 2) I use the word ‘neural’ instead of ‘neuroscientific’ because I want to refer to the broader 53	  
category of defects detected by neurosciences as a whole, not just in single cell analyses (neuronal) or 54	  
brain anatomy. 55	  
The contrast between the intensional strategy and the ontological and extensional strategies can be 56	  
observed in Schramme (2013). While he does provide some details on the ontological positions in the 57	  
debate of the mind-body problem in a quite extensive part of his article, his persuasive key arguments 58	  
pertain to the explanatory roles of mental phenomena, especially psychiatric disorders, and require 59	  
only a brief part of the text. Schrammes two convincing arguments for an irreducibility of psychiatric 60	  
disorders to neural defects are 1) even membership in a neurological category will not explain, why 61	  
the mental states realized by certain neural states are pathological. The ascription of pathology or of 62	  
being disordered is dependent on the psychological level of explanation. 2) In an aside he observes 63	  
that neurophysiological explanation does not even seek explanations of single event tokens.  64	  
According to Schramme’s first argument, the identification of a neurological class of states all of 65	  
which realize some psychiatric disorder would not suffice to explain the psychiatric disorder in 66	  
question (Schramme 2013, 5 f.). This argument can be further supported by some details on how the 67	  
concepts in question are embedded in their explanatory projects. 68	  
‘Psychiatric disorder’ and ‘neural defect’ are concepts from quite different disciplinary contexts 69	  
which slowly coalesce: ‘psychiatric disorder’ is first and foremost a concept of a ‘-iatric’ discipline, 70	  
namely psychiatry. ‘Neural defect’ is mainly a concept of neuroanatomy and -physiology. Both are 71	  
functional concepts that serve a disciplinary purpose and have been shaped in order to do so. A 72	  
concept is a functional concept by virtue of its embeddedness in functional explanation.  73	  
The functional explanatory strategy consists in decomposing a specific explanandum into a set of 74	  
distinct parts and trying to show how the parts and their forces account for the original phenomenon: 75	  
“ […] the analytical strategy proceeds by analyzing a disposition d of a into a number of other 76	  
dispositions d1…dn had by a or components of a such that programmed manifestations of the di 77	  
results in or amounts to a manifestation of d.” (Cummins 1975, 759)  78	  
The process of decomposition will be iterated during a functional explanation of complex systems, 79	  
especially in explaining the behavior of an organism. The crucial question at each onset of 80	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decomposition is what to pick out as the phenomenon to explain. This decision recurs in every 81	  
iteration of the decomposition procedure. In a decomposition of arm movement one has to decide 82	  
whether to analyze the behavior of the muscles or that of the tendons or bones. On the next deeper 83	  
level one chooses whether to analyze the behavior of cells or that of extracellular transport systems 84	  
etc. Thus, just as the specific explanandum depends on the background theory, the explanatory path 85	  
in functional explanation depends on the decompositional decisions.  86	  
Two distinct sub-types of this method give rise to the concepts of a psychiatric disorder and of a 87	  
neural defect. Their differences are threefold: (1) Context of detection. Psychiatric disorders strike 88	  
the observer as something to be explained and treated: Usually psychiatric disorders are 89	  
abnormalities of behavioral patterns observed in terms of folk and scientific psychology. Either they 90	  
themselves are the reason for an analysis of the behavioral pattern or the pattern has been the target 91	  
of prior interest in psychology or cognitive science.  92	  
Neural defects are further removed from casual attention: Neural defects are abnormalities in the 93	  
working of causal pathways, in the parts and forces making up a phenomenon. They can only be 94	  
found after an analysis. The abnormalities in these pathways can but need not result in abnormalities 95	  
in behavior. 96	  
(2) Context of action. The analysis of psychiatric disorders is driven by the desire to understand a 97	  
behavioral abnormality and if possible to find a therapy or workaround. Neural defects in contrast are 98	  
found in analysis driven by a purely explanatory research interest.  99	  
(3) Last but not least, the context of explanation. Neural defects turn up when physiological 100	  
phenomena are analyzed into physiological parts and their tempo-spatial relations. A neural defect 101	  
primarily is defined within a mechanistic explanation of some neural phenomenon (Bechtel 2009; 102	  
Craver 2013). Mechanistic explanation typically elucidates relatively complex behaviors of 103	  
biological systems by the actions and interactions of their constituting subsystems. The actions and 104	  
interactions of the subsystems in turn are explained by actions and interactions of their respective 105	  
subsystems, insofar as mechanistic explanation is a type of functional explanation as mentioned 106	  
above (Craver 2013). Mechanistic explanation is a special type of functional explanation however, 107	  
because it strictly sticks to componential analysis, that is: the subsystems stand in a physical part-108	  
whole relation to the system which gets explained. The main interest in ascribing a function and 109	  
noticing a defect is explanatory. Something is a function because it contributes to some complex 110	  
behavior in most homologues which a scientist aims to explain. The word ‘function’ could be 111	  
replaced by ‘normal causal role’. Something is a defect, because in the more numerous homologues 112	  
the causal pathways work differently. The word ‘defect’ in this context could be replaced by 113	  
‘abnormality’. 114	  
A similar type of analysis can be found in cognitive science, with the not so minor variation that 115	  
what gets explained are cognitive abilities and behavior, and they typically get analysed into 116	  
cognitive and affective sub-tasks and capacities. There are for example theories of long term 117	  
memory, distinguishing it into subtasks of encoding and consolidation, storage and retrieval as well 118	  
as into different subtypes like episodic, semantic, procedural and priming memory. The explaining 119	  
subsystem and the system which get explained do not stand in a physical part-whole-relation. The 120	  
decomposition is cybernetic and not componential. 121	  
While neural abnormalities can be considered defective only relative to explanatory interests, it 122	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seems to be possible to identify cognitive or affective defects beyond such an interest (contra Stier 123	  
2013). If a person can’t grasp objects in her right visual field, or can’t remember words for more than 124	  
a few moments, that seems to be a defect no matter what. This alleged obviousness of there being a 125	  
defect stems from the close interdependence of cognitive science and psychiatry as regards their 126	  
phenomena as well as their methodology. The psychiatric diagnosis of a defect and thus the 127	  
psychiatric ascription of function and dysfunction is often prior to analysis in cognitive science. The 128	  
discussion how to define functions in psychiatry is still on-going and vast (for an overview cf. 129	  
Schramme 2010). None of the suggestions, however, takes recourse to analyzing complex behaviors 130	  
into physical parts and forces as is done in mechanistic explanation. The explanantia of both 131	  
methods, psychological and psychiatric, do not stand in a physical part-whole relation to the system 132	  
and behaviour explained.  133	  
To conclude: Neural defect and psychiatric disorder are defined within different types of analysis. 134	  
One is componential, decomposing complex phenomena based on purely explanatory interests, 135	  
ascribing function on the basis of comparison to homologues. The other is non-componential, 136	  
decomposing complex phenomena based on interventionist interests, ascribing functions on the basis 137	  
of systemic goals. The categories are thus neither identical nor bear an obvious intensional relation. 138	  
As Schramme concludes, there is no reason for “discounting any of the two—neurophysiological or 139	  
mental—perspectives. Mental illness is not reducible to brain illness, even when mental phenomena 140	  
have their basis in the brain.” (Schramme 2013) 141	  
It is highly implausible that two categories based on different methods, research interests etc. are 142	  
homomorphic, that is, can be related in a one to one style. As Schramme (2013, 6) points out as well, 143	  
it would be more than surprising if for every taxonomic class of folk psychology, or, as I must add, of 144	  
psychiatry there were one related type of neural defect or the other way around. As results in 145	  
cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychiatry and related disciplines already show, the relation between 146	  
neural defect and psychiatric disorder is much more complicated: different neural defects can result 147	  
in the same disorder, sometimes a psychiatric disorder is caused by several coincidental neural 148	  
defects etc. Thus, even if the metaphysical thesis, that all mental states are token identical to physical 149	  
states is true, and I take it to be true, that does not help one bit in explaining or treating any of them.  150	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